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MINIMIZING SHIRKING THROUGH LABOR POLICIES
I. INTRODUCTION
The cost of employee shirking is an expense most retail sales 
companies face. As defined by Alan B. Krueger, shirking is "any employee 
action that reduces output."^ Krueger cites common examples of shirking 
Including theft, poor service, absenteeism, and high turnover. This study 
looks for statistical relationships between labor policies and the cost of 
shirking. We will also look at the cost effectiveness of using specific policies 
to decrease employee shirking.
In the field of economics, it has long been theorized that a direct, 
casual relationship exists between the level of wages paid and the effort 
expended on the job. However, many problems exist with proving this 
relationship with empirical data. Most of the models we researched had to 
assume a homogeneous labor force. This assumption does not allow the 
models to separate the variations in effort that stem from Individual abilities 
from those that are related to the wage paid. Since ail the workers are 
assumed to be of identical ability, then all differences In productivity must be 
due to wage policies. Our model Is also unable to relax the assumption of a 
homogeneous labor force because our data does not provide an Indication of 
worker heterogeneity.
Many of the empirical studies that do exist focus on the relationship 
between wages and effort In manufacturing. One of the most famous
1 Krueger (1991), pg. 84.
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studies is that of Henry Ford's $5 workday. In 1914, Henry Ford almost 
doubled the wages of the workers in his auto factories to $5 per day. The 
Increase in productivity combined with the fall in absenteeism and turnover 
more than compensated for the increase in labor costs.2
Such wage policy suggestions are harder to make for the service 
sector because effort in the service sector is more difficult to measure. To 
overcome the difficulty In measuring effort as a whole, this study uses the 
amount short from cash registers as an Indication of low effort. By capturing 
effects of both theft and negligence, cash short can give us a good indication 
of the effort expended on the job. We also wanted to measure turnover and 
absenteeism as indications of low effort, but our data was unable to provide 
a reliable measure of these variables.
A further complication Is that effort expended Is also a function of how 
strictly employees are supervised. Though some have suggested that the 
relationship between supervision and the wage paid is direct, in our model, 
since an increase in effort can be had by either an Increase in wages or an 
Increase in the level of supervision, higher supervision and high wages are 
substitutes. A study by Alan B. Krueger finds empirical evidence of the 
inverse relationship between higher wages and higher levels of supervision. 
He studied the wage differentials between fast food restaurants that were 
company owned and those that were franchised. He found that the less 
supervised company owned stores paid low-level managers about 9% more 
that did the more highly supervised franchised stores. Also, crew workers of 
the company run stores earned l%-2% more than crew workers at the 
franchised restaurants.^ while our theoretical model does make effort a
2 Raff (1987).
3 Krueger (1991).
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function of supervision, we do not have the data on supervision to try to 
estimate the empirical relationship.
In this study, definite relationships were established between the 
amount of cash short from a register and labor policies. The larger the 
spread between a firm's starting wage and the highest cashiers wage, the 
lower the cash short. An inverse relationship between the payment of 
incentive pay to cashiers and cash short was also found. An increase In the 
number of W-2s issued for managers and cashiers was associated with an 
Increase in the amount of cash short. The difference between the firm's 
highest cashier's wage and the state's average wage was unexpectedly 
found to be positively related to cash short.
The remainder of the paper consists of a description of the model. 
Including the null hypotheses. I will then discuss the data and the significant 
variables. After performing statistical tests of model specification, I will 
detail the regression results. Next, I will calculate the cost effectiveness of 
suggested policies. In conclusion, I will summarize the practical applications 
suggested by this study.
II. THE MODEL^
In our model, an employee's utility Is a function of the wage they 
receive and a negative function of the effort they expend on the job. To 
Illustrate the theoretical model, we will reduce the wage and utility variables 
to binary terms; a higher-than-average wage,(W); a low wage,(w); high 
effort,(l); and low effort or shirking,(0). In an employment situation where 
a high wage is offered, an employee may chose to give high or low effort. 
Using the theory of expected utility, we can examine what makes an
^ Theoretical model formed and suggested by Dr. Paul Storer.
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employee choose to give high effort.
We can calculate the expected value of utility using a von Neumann- 
Morgenstern utility function. A von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function 
calculates the expected utility by summing possible utilities multiplied by the 
probabilities of the possible utilities.
If a worker is in a high paying job, he may choose to give little effort. 
While this maximizes his utility if he Is not caught, if he is caught shirking, 
he will face losing his high paying job and having to accept an average 
paying position. The probability of being caught shirking is denoted as rho. 
Thus, when a high wage worker chooses to shirk, his expected utility equals:
E{U)w 0 = ^ ^(^,0)]+[px «(w,0)]
A high paid worker who does gives high effort faces lower utility than a 
shirking worker who is not caught, but may face a higher expected utility 
because there is no risk of being fired. Therefore, a worker will choose to 
give low effort only if the expected utility while shirking exceeds the 
expected utility while giving high effort. The cost of shirking Increases as 
the spread between the high and low wage increases and as the probability 
of being caught increases.
The empirical model used in this study is an Ordinary Least Squares 
regression using a semi-log function.
\n(cash _short). = + P'^Big _Sales). + _Sales)^ i
^{Cashier _W 2s). + p ^{Manager _W 2s). + P ^{Cashier ^Incentive _Pay).
+P ^(Managers _ Bonus). +P ^{Optimum _Cashiers). +Pg(Urban). 
+P^Q(Interstate). ■\-p^^NewHire_Traming_Hours). -^p^^CreditCard_Cost). 
•^p j verage _ Gap). + p^ ^Firm's _ Wage _ Gap). + e-
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A semi-log function is used when the effects of the independent variables on 
the dependent variable gets larger as the dependent variable gets larger. 
This occurs because the coefficients of the independent variables are the 
percent changes that a one unit change In the independent variable causes 
In the dependent variable. To calculate the absolute change caused by a 
one unit change in the independent variable, we simply have to multiply the 
coefficient (percentage change) by the original amount of the dependent 
variable. We can see that the absolute change in the dependent variable will 
be larger when the original amount is large.
The null hypotheses tested by this model are: 1) that a store that 
gives employees more opportunities for future hourly wage Increases will 
have less cash short. 2) that a firm that is relatively more generous than 
other firms in the same state will have less cash short. 3) the payment of 
Incentive pay to cashiers decreases the amount of cash short. 4) that a 
larger number of employees that worked for the firm within the year, as 
measured by the number of W-2s, will have a direct relationship with cash 
short.
The use of the semi-log function Is particularly beneficial In our 
cost/benefit analysis. Since the dependent variable is the log of cash short, 
the results of the regression are interpreted such that a one unit change in 
the Independent variable causes a percentage change in cash short equal to 
the coefficient of the independent variable. Using this property, we can 
calculate the dollar effect on cash short of a change In labor policies by 
multiplying the coefficient of the changing independent variable by the 
original amount of cash short. Since the coefficient is a percentage change 
of the original cash short, stores with larger cash short problems will have 
greater benefits from the policy change. By subtracting the cost of the
5
policy change from the benefit, we can see If a net cost or net benefit will 
result.
III. THE DATA
The data used in this model is 1997 data contributed by 343 
convenience stores located throughout the United States. Each firm 
completed a form on a disk and submitted the disk. The entire data set was 
compiled directly from the disks. The data was collected by Francis Bologna 
at Wegmann-Dazet & Co. and was provided to me by Dr. David Nelson and 
Dr. Paul Storer. Thirty-six observations were eliminated because cash short 
was either or equal to zero and so the log of those variables could not be 
found. The negative cash short could be either an entry error or mean that 
the registers actually had more too much cash. I used the remaining 307 
observations to estimate the regression.
In familiarizing myself with the data, I discovered that some 
convenience stores reported extremely large cash short amounts. I decided 
not to eliminate the outliers because I could not be sure they were data 
entry errors. Summary statistics of the variables are Included in Appendix 1.
Cash short refers to the dollar amount that each convenience store 
reported was short from the cash registers In 1997. Though employee effort 
can not reliably be measured, evidence of low effort can be. Cash short 
serves as a proxy for shirking, capturing costs due to theft of cash and 
negligence at the register. Summary statistics and a histogram of cash 
short appear In Appendix 2.
Big 8 sales is the 1997 dollar amount of tobacco, alcohol, beverage, 
snack foods, packaged and frozen foods, grocery Items, and general 
merchandise sales. This means that gasoline sales and other sales such as 
deli, car wash, lottery, etc., are not Included This variable Is Included
6
because the size of a store very likely affects the amount of cash short 
because the increased number of transactions allow for more opportunities 
for theft and mistakes. Summary statistics and a histogram of Big 8 sales 
can be viewed In Appendix 3. The square of Big 8 sales was also included 
because the evidence suggested that the relationship between sales and 
cash short was not linear.
The manager and cashier W-2 variables measure the number of W-2 
forms issued for each type of employee In 1997. Since the number of 
cashiers and managers employed at each firm at the year's end Is not 
known, the number of W-2s can not be used to measure turnover. Instead, 
a large number of W-2s could Indicate many employees, a high turnover, or 
some of both. By Including the number of W-2s Issued as an explanatory 
variable, we can see If the number of employees with access to the registers 
affects cash short.
Cashier Incentive pay is a binary variable. A 1 indicates that some sort 
of Incentive pay is offered to cashiers. This explanatory variable may be 
significant If the employees view the incentive pay as effectively Increasing 
their wage. This higher wage would Increase the cost of shirking. However, 
Incentive pay was not defined In the Instructions to the firms and so a wide 
range of Incentives and dollar amounts may be Included. This restricts the 
depth of the conclusions that can be drawn from the results relative to this 
variable.
The optimum number of cashiers was also not defined for the firms.
The most likely interpretation Is how many cashiers the firm usually alms to 
employ at one time and probably was Included as a question In order to be 
used to help calculate turnover. However, because of the lack of 
Instructions, firms could have reported an optimal number that differs
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significantly from the number they usually have employed. As an example, 
if a firm thinks that an optimal number would consist of enough full-time 
employees to cover all shifts, but the usual state of the firm is twice as many 
part-time employees, a turnover calculated based on the reported optimal 
number of cashiers would be greatly overstated.
The urban and Interstate variables are also binary variables where a 1 
signifies that the convenience store is located in the designated area. When 
both the urban and Interstate conditions are negative then the convenience 
store is located in a rural area.
New hire training hours refers to the number of paid hours that each 
employee is trained upon being hired.
Credit card cost is actually the dollar amount of sales that are paid for 
by credit cards. I included this variable as an explanatory variable because 
credit card transactions allow fewer opportunities for theft or mistakes than 
do cash transactions.
The average gap is defined as the firm's top wage minus the average 
wage of all the stores in the same state. This variable is used as a measure 
of how generous a store may appear to employees compared to other stores 
in the state. Summary statistics and a histogram of the average gap are 
found in Appendix 4.
The firm's wage gap measures the spread between the top wage a 
firm pays employees and the starting, base wage paid. This variable 
measures the possibility by advancement for remaining with the company.
If, by remaining with a company, an employee can expect to significantly 
increase their future earnings, being fired will entail a higher cost than if 
there is no possibility of Increased earnings. Summary statistics and a 
histogram of the firm's wage gap appear In Appendix 5.
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IV. THE RESULTS
The regression results can be viewed in Appendix 6. Before we begin 
to draw conclusions from these results, we must test for violations of the 
Classical Linear Assumptions. Important problems to identify and, if 
necessary, eliminate are multicolllnearity, autocorrelation, and 
heteroscedasticity.
Multicolllnearity means that two or more of the explanatory variables 
are highly correlated with one another. When multicollinearlty exists in a 
model, the coefficient estimates will be imprecise because the effects of the 
correlated variables can not be separated. While no standard test has been 
established to identify multicollinearlty, it is indicated by a high r2 but low t- 
statlstics, non-robust regression results, and a high correlation between 
variables. As we can see by the Correlation Matrix In Appendix 7, there Is a 
high correlation between the average gap and the firm's wage gap. While 
there Is no ready solution to fix this problem, I used differences in the wages 
to minimize the effects.
Autocorrelation is a violation of the Classic Linear Regression 
assumption that the residuals of a regression are independent. If 
autocorrelation does exist, estimation by the Ordinary Least Squares method 
will calculate coefficient estimates that are unbiased but Inefficient. This 
means that, due to the unnecessarily high variance, it is more likely that any 
given sample of the population will estimate coefficients that are far off the 
true values. Another problem that occurs when autocorrelation exists is that 
the estimates' estimated variances are biased, usually downward, which 
leads to t-statlstics biased away from zero so that null hypotheses may be 
incorrectly rejected. Due to these problems. If autocorrelation does exist, it 
is Important to detect and correct for It before drawing conclusions from the
9
model.
Since autocorrelation is a correlation between the residuals, the 
problem often becomes apparent by looking at a plot of the residuals. We 
calculate the residuals using the OLS method. As we can see In the plot of 
the residuals In Appendix 8, there does not appear to be a pattern.
For a definitive answer, we compute the DW test. E-Vlew calculates 
the DW statistic for our model and we need to compare this to the critical
statistic. Using N=200 observations^ and k-l=l3 independent variables, 
excluding the Intercept, we find that the 1% critical dy DW statistic is
1.813.6 Comparing this to our calculated DW of 1.829945 (seen in the 
regression results) we can be more than 99% sure that first-order 
autocorrelation does not exist in our model. This coincides with the 
randomness seen in the plot of the residuals.
Heteroscedasticity is the violation of the assumption that the error 
terms have a constant variance. This problem causes the estimated 
coefficients to be inefficient so that any given estimate may be far off its 
true value. The estimated variance, however, will be underestimated 
causing the additional problem of inflated t-statistics. Heteroscedasticity is 
associated with cross sectional data and, therefore, is more likely to be a 
problem in this model than is autocorrelation. From amoung the standard 
tests for heteroscedasticity we chose the White Heteroscedasticity test which 
Is easily calculable in E-Vlews. We can see the results in Appendix 9. With
5 Our actual N=307, but I was unable to find a more suitable DW table. 
Since an Increasing number of observations reduces the critical du statistic, 
our calculated DW would still be above the du statistic using N=307.
6 Critical DW statistic taken from Basic Econometrics, Gujarati, Damodar N. 
McGraw-Hill, Inc. New York. 1995. p. 821. They had taken it from Savin and 
White, op. cit., by permission of the Econometrics Society.
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almost 92% probability, we can reject the null hypothesis that 
heteroscedasticity exists in this model.
To measure how well the explanatory variables actually do explain 
deviations in the dependent variable, we look at the adjusted R^. Many 
times r2 is mistakenly used to measure the fit of a model. However, r2 
increases whenever any explanatory variable Is added to the regression so a 
large r2 can be had by simply adding infinitely many explanatory variables. 
Adjusted r2 eliminates this problem by weighing the benefit of each 
additional explanatory variable against the cost of degrees of freedom. 
Unless the additional variable contributes significantly to the explanatory 
power of the model, adjusted r2 will decrease. For this model, the adjusted 
r2 Is .248503. This Is a reasonable adjusted r2 for a set of cross-sectional 
data.
T-statistics measure the probability that the related variable does not 
significantly contribute to explaining the dependent variable. The optimum 
number of cashiers, the location variables, the payment of cashier incentive 
pay and managers bonuses, and credit card charges all can be rejected as 
significant at the 5% level. The remaining variables are well within the 95% 
probability of significance standard.
We are now ready to discuss the coefficients estimated In our 
regression. The location of stores may not be significant, however, the 
coefficients suggest that a location in an urban area or near an Interstate 
Increases cash short. While the optimal number of cashiers may also be 
insignificant, an inverse relationship is suggested. Additional training hours 
and credit card charges both may have positive effects on cash short.
The signs of the coefficients on the Big 8 sales variables provide 
valuable information. The coefficient on the Big 8 sales variable is positive,
11
meaning that as the sales of a store increase, so does the cash short. 
However, the coefficient on the Big 8 sales squared variable is negative, 
suggesting that the effect of sales on cash short decreases as sales become 
larger. This makes sense because more sales allow more opportunities for 
theft and errors, but as a store's size increases, the opportunities for theft 
may also be mitigated by increased security measures. This Is especially 
true when there are large up-front costs to install the security measures.
A small negative relationship was found between the payment of 
bonuses to managers and cash short. A store that does pay manager 
bonuses can expect to have a tiny percentage less cash short than a store 
that does not pay bonuses to managers.
Looking at the variables which deal with labor policies and for which 
null hypotheses were formed, the only surprise was the results related to the 
generosity of the firm relative to the state In which it is located. The null 
hypothesis relating to this variable was that an Inverse relationship would be 
established. While the generosity of the firm compared to the state did 
prove to have a strong relationship with cash short. It proved to be a 
positive one. The coefficient of .534684 suggests that a one dollar Increase 
In the spread between the top wage in a firm and the state average wage 
causes about a 53.5% increase in cash short. This unexpected result may 
be an effect of multicollinearity.
Both the number of cashier and manager W-2's issued annually do 
have a positive relationship with cash short. Each additional cashier W-2 
issued results In a 2.4% increase In cash short while each additional 
managerial W-2 issued is related to a 11% Increase in cash short, all else 
held constant. Two ways to decrease the number of employees are to 
reduce part-time employees in favor of full-time help and to reduce
12
employee turnover.
We hypothesized that the payment of cashier Incentive pay would 
have an inverse relationship with cash short. While an inverse relationship is 
suggested, the model also suggests that cashier incentive pay may not be 
significant in explaining the amount of cash short.
The null hypothesis related to the prospect for wage increases was 
that an Inverse relationship would be found. This hypothesis can be 
accepted. A one dollar Increase In the spread between a firm's top wage and 
their base wage will cause almost a 64.5% decrease in cash short.
V. COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS
The percentage changes that can be effected by a change in firm's 
wage gap may seem impressive, but we must remember that If a firm raises 
its top wage, its average gap is also affected. Since the firm's wage gap is 
usually fixed at the lower end by minimum wage laws. Its only choice to 
expand the wage gap Is to raise its top wage. Raising the top wage causes a 
64.5% decrease In cash short, but also increases the average wage gap, 
causing a corresponding increase in cash short of 53.5%. The net effect on 
cash short will only be a decrease of about 11%:
Benefit = (.644868-534684)*(Cash Short) = (.110184)*(Cash Short)
From the benefits, we subtract the cost of the one dollar wage 
Increase. I assumed that the new top wage would apply to one-fourth of the 
cashiers. Since I do not have any information on the percentage of 
employees currently earning the top wage, I can not be sure if the on 
quarter assumption Is high or low. Due to variations In wage structures and 
the length of employee's employment, I imagine that, between stores, there
13
is also significant variation in the percentage of employees that make the 
top wage. Since it is reasonable to assume that less than 50% and more 
than 0% of employees will make the top wage, I chose the midpoint of 25%.
Cost = $1.00*.25*(Annual Cashier Hours) + $1.50*.25*(Annual Cashier
Overtime)
The net result for all but three of the convenience stores was that the 
cost of the higher wage would be greater than the benefits. The three stores 
for which it would be profitable to enact the greater wage started with large 
amounts of cash short. If the observations are true, then it makes sense 
that a store with an originally large cash short problem would benefit more 
than a store with a smaller cash short problem. However, we need to 
recognize that the observations may be data entry errors and we must be 
careful with our Interpretations of the results.
The summary statistics and histograms of the benefits, costs, and 
results can be viewed in Appendices 10, 11, and 12.
VI. CONCLUSION
Though the calculations suggest that most stores will not benefit from 
altering their labor policies, we must remember that cash short is a proxy 
variable for low effort. If other forms of shirking such as poor service, theft 
of goods, absenteeism, and high turnover are similarly reduced by a higher 
wage, the benefits could be significantly higher.
While we can only perform a cost/benefit analysis on the labor policy 
of Increasing top wages, the payment of incentive pay could be a cost 
effective way of reducing cash short. A store may be able to construct an 
Incentive plan that will provide a net benefit.
14
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Appendix 2
Summary Statistics and Histogram for Cash Short
Series: CASH_.SHORT
Sample 1 343
Observations 343
Mean 2531.501
Median 1393.000
Maximum 41379.00
Minimum -2667.000
Std. Dev. 4145.932
Skewness 5.320513
Kurtosis 42.88404
Jarque-Bera 24352.55
Probability 0.000000
Appendix 3
Summary Statistics and Histogram for Big 8 Sales
0 500000 1000000 1500000 2000000
Series: BIG 8 SALES
Sample 1 343
Observations 343
Mean 512251.9
Median 453964.0
Maximum 2172226.
Minimum 15486.00
Std. Dev. 258254.4
Skewness 1.521347
Kurtosis 8.584952
Jarque-Bera 578.0932
Probability 0.000000
Appendix 4
Summary Statistics and Histogram for Average Wage Gap
Series: AVE GAP
Sample 1 343 
Observations 343
Mean 0.646676
Median 0.500000
Maximum 3.730435
Minimum -6.058929
Std. Dev. 0.797766
Skewness -1.363484
Kurtosis 17.49973
Jarque-Bera 3110.990
Probability 0.000000
Appendix 5
Summary Statistics and Histogram for Firm's Wage Gap
Series: FIRM_WAGEGAP
Sample 1 343
Observations 343
Mean 1.293353
Median 1.000000
Maximum 4.800000
Minimum -6.000000
Std. Dev. 0.929469
Skewness -0.779113
Kurtosis 13.21188
Jarque-Bera 1525.071
Probability 0.000000
Appendix 6
Regression Results
Dependent Variable: LOG(CASH_SHORT)
Method; Least Squares
Date: 03/29/99 Time; 12:47
Sample: 1 343
Included observations; 307
Excluded observations: 36
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 6.286149 0.287732 21.84727 0.0000
BIG 8 SALES 2.08E-06 6.24E-07 3.329146 0.0010
(BIG 8 SALES)''2 -9.29E-13 3.82E-13 -2.431188 0.0156
CASHIER_W2S 0.023759 0.007258 3.273232 0.0012
MANAGER W2S 0.111528 0.045608 2.445382 0.0151
CASH INCENT PAY -0.206485 0.138616 -1.489611 0.1374
MANAGERS BONUS -2.79E-05 1.43E-05 -1.943432 0.0529
OPTIMUM CASHIERS -0.019809 0.024924 -0.794791 0.4274
URBAN 0.101433 0.141781 0.715419 0.4749
INTERSTATE 0.134509 0.178253 0.754593 0.4511
N H TRAIN HOURS 0.000160 8.63E-05 1.857408 0.0643
CREDITCARD COST 1.42E-05 6.22E-06 2.290553 0.0227
AVE GAP 0.534684 0.193771 2.759360 0.0062
FIRM_WAGEGAP -0.644868 0.170563 -3.780810 0.0002
R-squared 0.280429 Mean dependent var 7.299117
Adjusted R-squared 0.248503 S.D. dependent var 1.125456
S.E. of regression 0.975646 Akaike info criterion 2.833096
Sum squared resid 278.9022 Schwarz criterion 3.003050
Log likelihood -420.8802 F-statistic 8.783623
Durbin-Watson stat 1.829945 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
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Appendix 8
Plot of Regression Residuals
Appendix 9
White Heteroskedasticity Test:
F-statistic 0.604888 Probability 0.919588
Obs*R-squared 13.74138 Probability 0.910403
Test Equation:
Dependent Variable: RESID''2
Method: Least Squares
Date: 05/17/99 Time: 16:53
Sample: 1 343
Included observations: 307
Excluded observations: 36
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 0.776263 0.710254 1.092936 0.2753
BIG 8 SALES 1.92E-06 2.02E-06 0.949845 0.3430
BIG 8 SALES''2 -1.06E-12 1.86E-12 -0.571152 0.5683
((BIG 8 SALESr2)''2 5.57E-26 3.10E-25 0.179987 0.8573
CASHIER^W2S -0.013922 0.030981 -0.449371 0.6535
CASHIER_W2S''2 0.000106 0.000529 0.199644 0.8419
MANAGER W2S 0.177588 0.212739 0.834769 0.4045
MANAGER W2S'^2 -0.028104 0.025354 -1.108442 0.2686
CASH INCENT PAY -0.257776 0.224685 -1.147276 0.2522
MANAGERS_BONUS -5.97E-05 6.51 E-05 -0.917996 0.3594
MANAGERS BONUS'' 2.27E-09 2.73E-09 0.830161 0.4071
OPTIMUM CASHIERS -0.073404 0.095230 -0.770807 0.4415
OPTIMUM CASHIERS 0.004085 0.004409 0.926597 0.3549
URBAN 0.136749 0.231709 0.590175 0.5555
INTERSTATE 0.356164 0.293632 1.212959 0.2262
N H TRAIN HOURS -0.000214 0.000302 -0.709355 0.4787
N H TRAIN HOURS'' 2.04E-08 3.75E-08 0.543065 0.5875
CREDITCARD COST -1.88E-06 1.92E-05 -0.097901 0.9221
CREDITCARD COST'' 7.23E-12 2.35E-10 0.030746 0.9755
AVE GAP 0.303510 0.353325 0.859012 0.3911
AVE GAP''2 0.140386 0.190068 0.738611 0.4608
FIRM WAGEGAP -0.146372 0.471757 -0.310270 0.7566
FIRM_WAGEGAP''2 -0.089088 0.156822 -0.568082 0.5704
R-squared 0.044760 Mean dependent var 0.908476
Adjusted R-squared -0.029237 S.D. dependent var 1.488954
S.E. of regression 1.510564 Akaike info criterion 3.734807
Sum squared resid 648.0323 Schwarz criterion 4.014017
Log likelihood -550.2929 F-statistic 0.604888
Durbin-Watson stat 2.098371 Prob( F-statistic) 0.919588
Appendix 10
Summary Statistics and Histogram of Benefits
Series: BENEFIT
Sample 1 343
Observations 343
Mean 278.9310
Median 153.4863
Maximum 4559.304
Minimum -293.8607
Std. Dev. 456.8154
Skewness 5.320513
Kurtosis 42.88404
Jarque-Bera 24352.55
Probability 0.000000
Appendix 11
Summary Statistics and Histogram of Costs
Series: COST
Sample 1 343 
Observations 343
Mean 3081.589
Median 2666.875
Maximum 12289.12
Minimum 427.8750
Std. Dev. 1628.776
Skewness 1.895873
Kurtosis 8.966731
Jarque-Bera 714.2863
Probability 0.000000
Appendix 12
Summary Statistics and Histogram of Results
Series: RESULT
Sample 1 343
Observations 343
Mean -2802.658
Median -2464.146
Maximum 2200.645
Minimum -11225.19
Std. Dev. 1628.086
Skewness -1.543676
Kurtosis 8.293744
Jarque-Bera 536.7302
Probability 0.000000
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